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I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of drug dogs in the United States began in 1970 when the United States Customs 
started using dog sniffs to detect the presence of contraband.1 This practice raised the Fourth 
Amendment issue of whether the use of a dog sniff required probable cause and a warrant.2
In United States v. Place,3 the United States Supreme Court found that a dog sniff is not a 
Fourth Amendment search because it is “less intrusive than a typical search” and because it 
reveals only “the presence or absence of narcotics.”4 Since that decision, some State courts have 
interpreted their constitutions to hold that a dog sniff is an unreasonable search.5 However, under 
Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures "shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."6 The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that:  “The right of the people to secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."7
1.  Barbara Tarlow, Note, Dog Sniff Searches and United States v. Thomas: The Second Circuit Takes a Bite 
Out of Place, 19 LO. L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1099 n.16 (1986). 
2. Kyle Hutson, Comment, The Supreme Court Lets the Dogs Out:  Reestablishing a Reasonable Suspicion 
Standard for Drug Dogs in Illinois, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 335, 339 (2006).   
 3. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
4. Id. at 707. 
5. Hutson, supra note 2, at 340.  The Pennsylvania and the New Hampshire constitutions “. . . more or less 
contained the same language as the Fourth Amendment . . .” and in both states their respective Supreme Courts held the dog sniff 
as a Fourth Amendment search after the Place decision.  Id. at 340–41.  
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.  
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2The purpose of this Note is to address the recent Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals 
decision State v. Rabb.8 In Rabb, the court held that a dog sniff conducted in the exterior of the home is a 
Fourth Amendment search.9 The court distinguished the factual scenario in Rabb from Place by focusing 
on the fact that in Place the use of the dog sniff was on baggage at an airport, while in Rabb, the use of 
the dog sniff was at a private residence.10 The court referred to the long-standing proposition that one's 
home is given extraordinary protection under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence11 and cited Kyllo v. 
United States12 as the controlling case in Rabb, 13 stating that a dog sniff at the home violates the Fourth 
Amendment because: 
 
[A]ny physical invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a fraction of an inch,” was too 
much, and there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely 
cracks open the door and sees nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.  In the home, 
our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes.14
This Note argues that a dog sniff, as conducted in Rabb, is not a Fourth Amendment search.  
Ultimately, this Note will contend that a dog sniff conducted in the exterior of a home open to public use 
does not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy at the home, and thus, is not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part II will briefly review relevant precedent on Fourth Amendment searches and dog 
sniffs.  Part III will address the relevant precedent on dog sniffs at a dwelling place in Florida, namely the 
decision in Nelson v. State.15 Part IV will explain the court’s reasoning in Rabb from both the majority’s 
perspective and the dissent’s perspective.  Part V will explain my criticisms and concerns of the Rabb 
decision.  I will then conclude with why the decision in Rabb unduly burdens law enforcement and must 
be overturned.  
 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Search and Seizure 
The Fourth Amendment provides a person with an individual expectation of privacy and protects 
against unreasonable governmental intrusion.16 There are two types of expectations that the Fourth 
Amendment provides; one involving searches, the other seizures.17 “A search occurs when an expectation 
 
8. 920 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. 4th  Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
9. Id. at 1187.  
10. See Id. at 1183–84 (distinguishing Place as a factually different scenario then Rabb because Place involved a 
dog sniff of luggage while Rabb involved a dog sniff at the door of a home).  
11. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[T]he ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth 
amendment is directed.’”); see also Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1189.
Juxtapose against the realities of travel by car and plane, the house stands strong and alone, shrouded in a cloak 
of Fourth Amendment protection.  A house is not movable or on display to the public (at least as far as its 
interior).  The interior of the house is not pervasively regulated by government.  If the Fourth Amendment has 
meaning at all, a dog sniff at the exterior of a house should not be permitted to uncloak this remaining bastion of 
privacy, this most sacred of places under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1189 
12. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
13. See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1184–85 (relying on Kyllo, the court determined that a dog sniff intrudes into the 
“intimate details” of the home); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (distinguishing a private dwelling place 
from a public place, such that in a private dwelling place an individual is entitled to a higher level of privacy).  
14. Id. at 1183 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted)).  
15  867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
16. Joie M.B.C. Yuen, Casenote, Kyllo v. United States: The Warrantless Use of Thermal Imagery Devices, and 
Why the Public Use Standard Proves Unworkable, 24 HAWAII L. REV. 383, 386 ( 2001).  
17. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 ( 1984).  
3of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.  A seizure of property occurs when 
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property.”18 The 
United States Supreme Court has “consistently construed this protection as only applying to governmental 
action[,] ” holding that the Fourth Amendment is “wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an 
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any governmental official."19 
Moreover, it is well settled that searches and seizures of property in plain view are presumptively 
reasonable.20 Whether it is residential or commercial, the basic principle is the same :  "What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." 21 For example, the Court has found that a search and seizure of garbage left for collection 
outside the cartilage of the home, even absent a warrant, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.22 This is 
because aromas entering the public domain, “if and when they leave a building” are not subjectively held 
as private—an assumption otherwise is “not only implausible but also surely not ‘one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’"23 
B. The Dog Sniff 
The United States Supreme Court has relied on two cases in determining that the use of a dog 
sniff is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.24 In the first case, Place, the Court first considered the 
question of whether a dog sniff constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.25 In 
Place, law enforcement officers at an airport in Miami, Florida, became suspicious of a passenger because 
of his peculiar behavior.26 Upon arriving in New York, the officers moved his bags to another airport and 
subjected them to a dog sniff.27 The dog alerted to one bag.28 The passenger was arrested after the bag 
was found to contain cocaine.29 
The Supreme Court held in Place that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because "the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less 
intrusive than a typical search.”30 The decision in Place is applied as a general categorization, rather than 
a narrow holding applying only to dog sniffs of airplane luggage.31 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
20. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586 (1980)).  
21. Id. at 42 ( quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967)).  
22. See Californina v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).  According to the Court, because the defendants 
left the garbage in a public area they “had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.”  Id. 
at 41. 
23.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Halen, J., concurring) ).   
24. See Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald II) v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1009–1011 (Md. 2004).  After analyzing the decisions 
in both Place and Jacobsen, the court held that:  “Place and Jacobsen together establish that government tests, such as a [dog 
sniff], that can reveal only the presence or absence of narcotics and are conducted from a location where the government officials 
are authorized to be, i.e. a public place, are not searches.”  Id.  
25. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697–98 (1983).  
26. Id. at 698. 
27  Id.  
28. Id. at 699. 
29. Id.  
30. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.  
31. Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald II) v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1010–11 n.5 (Md. 2004).  According to the court in 
Fitzgerald II: “The vast majority of state courts considering dog sniffs have recognized that a [dog] sniff is not a Fourth 
Amendment Search . . .  [and] [o]f the remaining states considering the issue, most have held based on their state constitutions 
that a dog sniff is a search requiring reasonable suspicion.”  Id.   
4The second case, United States v. Jacobsen,32 affirmed the Place holding by relying on the 
limited scope of a field test as compared to a dog sniff.33 In Jacobsen, a damaged package was subjected 
to a field test after employees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery substance in the 
innermost of a series of four plastic bags.34 In examining the nature of the dog sniff, the Court held that a 
government field test, like a dog sniff, does not offend an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights because 
such tests do “not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."35 This is because the manner in which 
information is obtained through a field test, much like a dog sniff, does not offend a legitimate privacy 
interest—revealing only the presence or absence of contraband items.36 
Both Place and Jacobson establish that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because of its narrow scope—it detects only illegitimate, contraband items.37 Further, the two cases 
affirm that it is “the focus and nature of the [dog sniff], rather than on the object sniffed, in determining 
whether a legitimate privacy interest exists.”38 
1. Impact of Thomas 
 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the landmark decision 
United States v. Thomas,39 held that a dog sniff conducted outside an apartment violated the Fourth 
Amendment.40 In Thomas, an apartment was searched pursuant to a warrant that authorized a search for 
narcotics.41 The State claimed that probable cause existed in part because of a dog sniff outside the 
apartment door.42 Evidence seized was suppressed because the court determined that the dog sniff 
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.43
In its decisions, the court “recognized the heightened privacy interest that an individual has in his 
dwelling place."44 The court stated that a person in his home reasonably infers a full intention of privacy 
that society is prepared to respect, and a dog sniff at a dwelling place violates that expectation.45
32. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  
33.  See Id. at 123–24.  In Jacobsen, the Court stated that:  
[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is [a narcotic], and no other arguably “private” 
fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest. 
 This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place [citation omitted], in which the Court held that 
subjecting luggage to a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog was not a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment . . . . 
 Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the record will actually compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id.  
34. Id. at 111–12.  
35. Id. at 123. 
36. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (holding that “[a] chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a 
particular substance is [a narcotic] does not compromise any legitimate interest . . .” and that “. . . all of the tests conducted under 
circumstances comparable. . .” compromise “. . . no legitimate interest”). 
37. See Fitzgerald v. State (Fitzgerald II), 864 A.2d 1006, 1011 (2004) (holding that Place and Jacobsen together 
establish that a dog sniff conducted by a governmental official in a place they are constitutionally permitted to occupy is not a 
Fourth Amendment search because it only reveals “the presence or absence of narcotics”).  
38. Id.  
39. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). 
40. Id. at 1367 (“Because of defendant Wheelings’ heightened expectation of privacy inside his dwelling, the 
[dog] sniff at his door constituted a search . . . [that] violated the Fourth Amendment.”).  
41. Id. at 1366.  
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1367.  
44. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366.  
45. Id. (citing United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980)).  In Taborda, the Second Circuit of the 
United States Court of Appeals suppressed contraband evidence found inside an apartment because it was spotted by law 
enforcement agents with the help of a high-powered telescope, which the court held as a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
because the telescope’s use violated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of a dwelling place.  Taborda, 635 F.2d at 
139.  According to the court, “[t]he very fact that a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to 
5However, notably, the court:  1) failed to apply Place; and 2) discounted the fact that a dog sniff will 
disclose only the presence or absence of narcotics.46
Essentially, the court determined the dog sniff intrusive in the apartment because it was a way “of 
detecting the contents of a private, enclosed place."47 Moreover, the court saw the dog sniff as a 
significant enhancement in law enforcement's ability to search via a “far superior, sensory instrument."48 
Thus, because of the heightened expectation of privacy in the home, and because the court saw the dog 
sniff as an unlawful enhancement of searching capability for law enforcement, the court concluded that a 
dog sniff conducted outside a dwelling house violates the Fourth Amendment. 49 
2. Impact of Kyllo 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held the use of thermal imaging to detect heat inside a residence for 
the purpose of establishing the presence of marijuana as an unconstitutional search under the Fourth 
Amendment.50 The Court held that the use of the thermal imager allowed law enforcement to use sense 
enhancing technology to intrude into the constitutionally protected area of the home.51 The Court 
reasoned that the feared injury is not the quality or quantity of information obtained through the search; 
but rather that law enforcement, via the thermal imaginer, used sense enhancing technology that crossed 
the "firm line" of the Fourth Amendment protection of the home.52 The Court simply stated that when the 
Government uses a device which is capable of revealing typically unknown, intimate details of the home, 
and when such device is not in general public use, the use of the device is presumptively a violation of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.53
III. DOG SNIFFS OF A DWELLING PLACE IN FLORIDA: The NELSON V. STATE DECISION 
The decision in Nelson is pertinent to both the majority's and dissent's argument in Rabb. In 
Nelson, an officer took his drug dog to a hotel and walked the hallway outside of the defendant’s room.54 
The dog sniffed all room entrance doors in the hallway, but alerted only at Nelson's door.55 The 
information was then included in an affidavit to obtain a search warrant.56 The defendant argued that 
management had no right to waive his privacy rights, which at the hotel, was the equivalent of his private 
 
have privacy, and if that inference is borne out by his actions, society is prepared to respect his privacy.”  Id. at 138; see also 
United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 937 (stating that “it was not the enhancement of the senses per se that was held 
unlawful in Taborda, but the warrantless invasion of the right to privacy in the home).  
46 . See generally Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1359–76.  
47. See id 757 F.2d at 1366–67.  According to the court, “[a]lthough using a dog sniff for narcotics may be 
discriminating and unoffensive relative to other detection methods, and will disclose only the presence or absence of narcotics 
[citation omitted] it remains a way of detecting the contents of a private, enclosed space.”  Id.  
48. Id. at 1367.  
49. See Id. (holding that a dog sniff is a sensory enhancing instrument that violates a legitimate expectation of 
privacy).   
50. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Since we hold the Thermovision imaging to have been an 
unlawful search . . . .”).  
51. See Id. (holding that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore the details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical instrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).  
52. See Id. at 37 According to the Court, “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied 
to measurement of the quality of quanity of information obtain[,]” but rather that “any physical invasion of the structure of the 
home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much.”  Id.; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) 
(holding that eavesdropping accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the home violates the Fourth 
Amendment and that any violation of the privacy of the home, “by even a fraction of an inch[,]” violates the Fourth Amendment). 
53. Kyllo, 365 U.S. at 40.  
54. Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
6residence.57 Also, the defendant argued that the police enlisted the use of a sensory enhancing 
technology—the narcotics dog.58
However, in Nelson, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeals reaffirmed the reasoning in 
Jacobsen, stating that “[b]ecause a dog’s sniff ‘could reveal nothing about non-contraband items,’ it does 
not generally intrude into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”59 Vital to the courts decision in 
Nelson was its determination that areas "such as hallways, which are open to use by others may not be 
reasonably considered as private. "60 The court saw the Fourth Amendment as inapplicable to any action 
taking place in the hallway in front of the hotel room because the defendant had no legitimate expectation 
of privacy that extended into the hallway.61 In accordance with that reasoning, the court held a dog sniff 
in the hallway was reasonable because "just as evidence in the plain view of offices may be searched 
without a warrant . . . evidence in the plain smell may be detected without a warrant.”62 Essentially, the 
court held that the drug dog’s alert was lawful because the dog sniff detected an illegitimate item—
contraband—in a place where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy.63 Because of this, 
the court determined that the fact that a dog is a more skilled odor detector than a human is irrelevant.64 
Also, the court addressed the holding in Thomas, stating that it has been criticized by all federal 
courts who have considered it because of the Thomas court’s statement that “the defendant had a 
legitimate expectation that contraband in his closed apartment would remain private.”65 The court 
discounted Thomas by affirming the point that the Supreme Court has held “that a possessor of 
contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed."66
IV. THE DECISION IN STATE V. RABB 
A. The Majority 
 
James Rabb was charged with criminal information for possession of controlled substances—
including marijuana.67 The charges were the result of the issuance and execution of a search warrant of 
 
57. Id. The defendant in Nelson supported his argument with the decision in United States v. Thomas.  Id.  
58. Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 536 (“Nelson argues that the use of a dog’s sense of smell is tantamount to the use of a 
far superior, sensory instrument that enables a human being to detect articles normally discoverable only after entry into 
residences.”). 
59.  Id. at 537 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 n.24 (1984)). 
60. Id. at 535;  see also Brant v. State 349 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that because a 
hallway is a public place a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy to anything that enters therein).  
61. See Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537.  According to the court in Nelson, “ [i]t has long been recognized that 
reasonable expectations of privacy vary according to the context of the area searched[,]” and that “‘[t]he test of legitimacy is not 
whether the individual chooses to conceal asserterdly “private” activity . . . the correct inquiry is whether the government’s 
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.’”  Id. (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984)); see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (holding that the determination of 
whether a search is reasonable depends upon the context in which that search is conducted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
337 (1985) (“[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.”).  In Nelson, the court held that the 
defendant’s privacy expectation does not extend into the hotel room because it is a public corridor and that a dog sniff “detection 
of odor in common corridor does not contravene the Fourth Amendment.”  Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537.  
62. Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (“It has long been settled 
that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and 
may be introduced into evidence.”); United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a dog sniff of 
luggage in an airplane overhead compartment does not violate the Fourth Amendment because an individual has “no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the ambient air surround their luggage”); see also United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 
1994) (holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat that that is vented outside).  
63.  See Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537 (“As a result, we hold that a trained dog’s detection of odor in a common 
corridor does not contravene the Fourth Amendment.”).  
64. Id.; see United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that illegal odors smelled fall within 
the plain view doctrine and do not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
65. Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 536.  
66. Id. (quoting United States v. Coyler, 878 F.2d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  
67. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  
7his home.68 The warrant was obtained, in large part, as the result of a dog sniff at the front door of his 
residence.69
Rabb filed a motion to suppress in circuit court, contending that the dog sniff at his front door 
was a "search" requiring a warrant; and absent a warrant the "search" was illegal.70 The trial court entered 
an order granting the motion to suppress, finding that the dog sniff at Rabb’s front door was a warrantless 
search, and absent the warrant there was a lack of independent, lawfully obtained information to support 
probable cause.71 
On appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s motion to 
suppress.72 In its decision, the court sought to distinguish the use of a dog sniff over baggage at an airport 
from the use of a dog sniff at a private residence.73 More precisely, the court distinguished the home and 
the luggage as different "places" that have different constitutional protections under the Fourth 
Amendment.74 
First, in citing United States v. Katz,75 the stated that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places—with the main question being what protections are afforded to those people at the ‘place’ in 
question.76 The court then moved to an analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications as tied to the 
home—the“place” in question.77 In doing this, the court distinguished Place’s factual scenario from the 
factual scenario in Rabb and applied the holding in Thomas—noting that that in Place the dog sniff 
occurred in a public airport, while in Rabb, like Thomas, the dog sniff occurred at a residence.78 
The court affirmed an individual’s right to “retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”79 
Next, the court held Kyllo as the controlling case in Rabb.80 It saw the use of the thermal imager 
in Kyllo and the dog sniff in Rabb as running parallel because both instruments enhanced the senses of 
 
68. Id. 
69.  Id. at 1179. 
70. Id.  
71. Id. at 1180. In its decision, the trial court stated that the issue of a whether a dog sniff conducted at a 
residence constitutes a Fourth Amendment search is “. . .one of first impression in Florida.”  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1180. As such, 
the trial court considered Thomas as persuasive precedent in its holding that “. . . the use of the dog sniff of Rabb’s house 
amounted to a warrantless search and could not support the issuance of the subsequent search warrant for Rabb’s house.”  Id.  
72. Id. at 1192.  
73. Id. at 1184.  The court held that “[w]e are of the view that luggage located in a public airport is quite different 
from a house, not only in physical attributes, but also in the historical protection granted by law.”  Id.  
74.  See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1183–84.  According to the court, “[t]he function of ‘place’ in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence [is] instrumental . . . [and] ‘[p]lace’ is no less key in the case at bar . . . [such that] ‘a practice that is not intrusive in 
a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person’s home.’”  Id.  (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 
1366 (2d Cir. 1985)).  
75. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
76.  See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1182.  “Furthermore, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurring opinion in Katz:
‘As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”  The main question, however, is what 
protection it affords those people.  Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a “place.”’”  Id. (quoting 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).  
77.  See Id. (“When considering whether law enforcement at a house constitutes a search, it is necessary to 
consider the constitutional protections afforded a house throughout the long history of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
78.  Id. at 1183.  The court held that:  “In Place, the United States Supreme Court was not addressing the use of 
law enforcement investigatory techniques at a house . . . but rather only whether a dog sniff of luggage in an airport constituted 
search under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.  The court referenced this distinction in the Thomas holding:  “. . . ‘[A] practice that is 
not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person’s home.’”  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1184 (quoting 
Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366).  
79.  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1182 (quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86, 590 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).  The 
Supreme Court in Payton held that:  “The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings.  In none is 
the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”  
Payton, 445 U.S. at 589.   
80. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1182 (“Given the shroud protection wrapped around the house by the Fourth 
Amendment, we conclude that Kyllo [citation omitted] controls the outcome of the case at bar.”).   
8law enforcement to activities occurring behind the closed doors of a home.81 The court disregarded the 
fact that a dog sniff will only sense narcotics; and emphasized the point that law enforcement, by way of a 
dog sniff, can obtain information from inside the home that would otherwise remain private and protected 
under the Fourth Amendment.82 The court contended that although the drug dog smelled marijuana, that 
smell is still an “intimate detail” of Rabb’s home that is accorded Fourth Amendment protection.83 
The court then addressed the decision in Nelson.  The court, “[f]or two main reasons . . . 
conclud[ed] that Nelson neither control[led] nor conflict[ed]” with their decision in Rabb.84 First, the 
court reasoned that although “‘occupants of a hotel room are entitled to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment’ to much the same degree as occupants of a house, that principle is not without its 
limitations.”85 The court stated that:  
 
Despite the fact that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights do not evaporate when he rents a 
motel room, the extent of the privacy he is entitled to reasonably expect may very well diminish. 
For although a motel room shares many of the attitudes of privacy of a home, it also possesses 
many features which distinguish it from a private residence: A private home is quite different from 
a place of business or a motel cabin. A home owner or tenant has the exclusive enjoyment of his 
home, his garage, his barn, or other buildings, and also the area under his home. But a transient 
occupant of a motel room must share corridors, sidewalks, yards, and trees with the other 
occupants. Granted that a tenant has sharing to protect the room he occupies, there is nevertheless 
an element of public or shared property in motel surrounds that is entirely lacking in the 
enjoyment of one's home.86
Simply, the court reasoned that although “a hotel room may be nearly identical to a house for Fourth 
Amendment purposes[,]” it is still not a house, and therefore, is not accorded the same constitutional 
protections as the home.87 The court saw a hotel and home as having like privacy expectations under the 
Fourth Amendment—but the expectation of privacy surrounding the home was seen as higher because of 
the private nature of the home as compared to a hotel, where people knowingly subject themselves to 
public common areas, such as hallways.88 
81. See Id. at 1184. (“The use of the dog [sniff], like the use of a thermal imager, allowed law enforcement to use 
sense-enhancing technology to intrude into the constitutionally-protected area of Rabb’s house, which is reasonably considered a 
search violative of Rabb’s expectation of privacy in his retreat.”). 
82.  Id. 
[I]t is of no importance that a dog sniff provides limited information regarding only the presence or absence of 
contraband, because as in Kyllo, the quality of quantity of information obtained through the search is not the 
feared injury.  Rather, it is the fact that law enforcement endeavored to obtain the information from inside the 
house at all, or in this case, the fact that a dog’s sense of smell crossed the “firm line” of Fourth Amendment 
protection at the door of Rabb’s house.  
Id.  
83. Id. (“Because the smell of marijuana had its source in Rabb’s house, it was an ‘intimate detail’ of that house. 
”).  
84.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1185.  
85.  Id.; see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (holding that:  “What the Fourth Amendment 
protects is the security of man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his 
home or office, his hotel room or his automobile”).    
86.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1185 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting 
Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1964))).  
87.  Id. at 1186. 
88.  See Id. According to the court:  
[A hotel] is neither as private nor as sacrosanct [as a home].  As a result, the fact that the Fifth District [in 
Nelson] held that a trained canine’s dog sniff of hotel room does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the 
hotel corridor is a public area, does not conflict with our conclusion that the dog sniff of a private house, such as 
Rabb’s, violates the Fourth Amendment.  This is so for the same reasons of “place” discussed . . . when 
determining that Place  is not dispositive of this case, as it addressed public airports rather than private houses.  
Id. at 1186.  
9The second distinction made between Nelson and Rabb is that in Rabb “the distinction between 
unaided and technologically-enhanced surveillance is not without a difference as suggested in Nelson.”89
This was because in the home there is a risk of the odors of one's house being smelled by their neighbors, 
and the court saw that “there is no way to mitigate the risk of using dog sniffs where law enforcement 
unaided might be unable to smell illegal drugs growing in a house."90 The court contended that just as an 
individual’s voice can never soften enough to mitigate against the risk of intrusive surveillance, the smells 
of an individual’s home are not capable of softening enough to avoid detection by the "ultra-sensitive 
noses of dogs."91 
Moreover, the majority viewed “the reasonable expectation of privacy afford to locations along a 
hierarchy from public to private[,]”92 with the home having a greater expectation of privacy then a 
hotel.93 The court reasoned that just because an individual expects the presence of the public in the 
hallway outside a hotel room, it does not mean that an individual expects the presence of the public in the 
immediate area outside their home.94
B. The Dissent 
The dissent contended that the dog sniff conducted in front of Rabb's home does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in the space in front of the door that is a public area 
accessible from the street.95 This is based upon the contention that a "clear line of precedent" proves that 
“the space in front of the door [in Rabb] enjoyed no constitutional protection.”96 
As stated by the dissent:  “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not necessarily protect areas of a home 
which are ‘open and exposed to public view.’”97 Also, a person has no expectation of privacy on a front 
 
89.  Id.  In its reasoning, the court drew a parallel to United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984) 
stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment ‘protects conversations that cannot be heard except by means of artificial enhancement.’”  
Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1186 (quoting Mankani, 738 F.2d at 543).  In Mankani, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals explained that:  
The risk of being overheard is given in modern life, and any time people speak to one another they necessarily 
assume that risk.  “But as soon as electronic surveillance comes into play, the risk changes crucially.  There is 
no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true 
privacy.”  Absent a warrant, this kind of investigative intrusion bypasses the safeguards of a neutral magistrate’s 
predetermination of probable cause.  
Mankani, 738 F.2d at 543 (citation omitted).  
90.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1186.  According to the court: 
Because of the similarities highlighted . . . between the use of the thermal imager in Kyllo and the dog sniff in 
Rabb’s case, it would be difficult to posit the rationale of Mankani does not apply here.  The risk of odors of 
one’s house being smelled by the neighbors may be a “given of modern life,” but there is no way to mitigate the 
risk of using dog sniffs where law enforcement unaided might be unable to smell illegal drugs growing in a 
house.   
Id. 
91.  Id. (“Just as an individual would never be able to soften his voice enough to mitigate the risk of intrusive 
surveillance, he would never be able to soften the smells of his house enough to avoid detection by the ultra-sensitive noses of 
dogs.”) 
92.   Id.   
93.  See Id. at 1186–87. 
An airport and a highway are unquestionably public places with little or no privacy, as much as a home is 
undoubtedly a private place characterized by its very privacy.  A hotel room lies somewhere in between, 
because although it possess some of the aspects of a home, it also possesses some of the aspects of the itinerant 
life present in airports and on highways.  
Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1186–87.  
94.  Id. at 1187 (”An individual expects the public to be ready present in hallways outside a hotel room door, but 
an individual does not expect the public to be readily present on the porch outside the door to a home.”).  
95.  See Id. at 1193 (Gross, J., dissenting) (“No Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detectives and 
the dog went to the front door of Rabb’s residence, which was accessible from the street.”).  
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. (quoting State v. Duhart, 810 So.2d 972, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)); See e.g. Koehler v. State, 
444 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an individual has no expectation of privacy in an unenclosed 
porch that is open to public view.); State v. Detlefson, 335 So. 2d 371, 371 (holding that an individual has no expectation of 
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porch "'where a salesmen or visitors may appear at any time.'"98 Because nothing “prohibited the 
detectives from walking up to Rabb’s door” and because, regardless of the dog sniff, “a police officer 
may approach and knock on a suspect’s front door” without violating the Fourth Amendment—the 
dissent saw no Fourth Amendment violation.99
Next, the dissent addressed the holding in Place, contending that the majority misread and 
essentially misapplied that ruling—arguing that there is no legal distinction between officers and a drug 
dog in an airport with a suspect's luggage, and officers and a drug dog at the front door of a residence.100 
In its reasoning, the dissent pointed to the holding in Jacobsen, emphasizing the narrow scope of a dog 
sniff; specifically the fact that when a dog alerts it will only alert to narcotics and no other information 
within the home.101 The dissent argued, based on these two holdings, that the dog sniff in Rabb did not 
offend a legitimate expectation of privacy.102 The dissent argued that the standard set forth by Place and 
Jacobsen has nothing to do with where a dog sniff takes place, or of where a subjective expectation of 
privacy is entertained.103 Rather, because a dog sniff recognizes only narcotics, the commencement of a 
dog sniff at the door of a home does not offend the Fourth Amendment because an individual in 
possession of contraband in the home has no legitimate expectation of privacy as to that possession.104
Thereafter, the dissent pointed to Florida precedent which, after the holdings of Place and 
Jacobsen, “consistently ruled that a canine sniff for contraband does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
 
privacy as to contraband plainly visible on a front porch);  see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). In Ciraolo,
the Supreme court held that: 
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their 
eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.  Nor does the mere fact that an individual has take measures to 
restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to 
be and which renders the activities clearly visible. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.  
98.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1193 (quoting State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1981)); see Fla. Dep’t of 
Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Haire, 836 So. 2d 1040, 1055 n.7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “[a]n unfenced front 
yard . . . is not generally considered protected by the Fourth Amendment due to the lack of expectation of privacy in what is 
visible to the entire public”); Duhart, 820 So. 2d at 973 (“Although it is well settled that one has an expectation of privacy in his 
home or its curtilage, the Fourth Amendment is not necessarily a protection in areas of the home . . . which are open and exposed 
to public view.”); Wysong v. State, 614 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“It has been held that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the threshold of the home.”); Koehler v. State, 444 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (determining that an unenclosed front porch is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment); State v. Detlefson, 335 So. 2d 371, 
371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“It cannot be said that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front porch of 
his home where, presumably, delivery men and others were free to observe plants thereon.”). 
99.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1194; see Potts v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that “[a] police officer in the scope of his duties may approach a suspect’s front door and knock in an attempt 
to talk to that suspect”).  
100.  See Id. at 1197.  According to the dissent:  
The majority misreads Place when it asserts that “ [t]he function of ‘place’ in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
was instrumental in the decision in Place.” The majority erroneously suggests that the “feared injury” in this 
case is that “law enforcement endeavored to obtain information from inside the house at all.”   
 There is no legal distinction between officers in an airport with the suspect’s luggage, as in Place, and the 
officers and dog at the front door of Rabb’s residence in this case.  The Fourth Amendment did not preclude the 
officers in either case from being where they were when the [dog] sniff took place.  
Id.  
101.  See Id. “ [Jacobsen] provides a fuller rationale for why a narrowly focused investigative technique, one that 
reveals only the presence or absence of contraband, is not a Fourth Amendment ‘search.’”  Id.  
102. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1198.  “The Supreme Court observed that its holding in Jacobsen was ‘dictated’ by its 
ruling in Place; the Court referred to Place’s holding that ‘a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog was not a “search” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).   
103.  See Id. at 1199. “Even though Place . . . did not involve a dog sniff at a residence, ‘the rationale of Place and 
Jacobsen . . . had absolutely nothing to do with the locus either 1) of where the dog sniffing took place or 2) of where the 
subjective expectation of privacy was being entertained.”  Id. (quoting Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald I ) v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004)).  
104.  See Id. at 1200. “It is the criminal nature of the possession itself that takes the activity out from under the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment, not the place where the possession occurs.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1200 (quoting Fitzgerald I,
837 A.2d at 1030)). 
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search.”105 Specifically, the dissent pointed to Flowers v. State,106 where the court held that a dog sniff of 
a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment because "'its limited scope and method of 
investigation does not constitute a search.'"107 
The dissent then sought to discount the majority’s reliance on Thomas, pointing to the fact that 
the majority of circuits have held the Thomas opinion as unsound.108 For example, in United States v. 
Coyler,109 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia challenged the reasoning in Thomas:
As an initial matter, the very correctness of Thomas decision is called into question by its assertion 
that the defendant "had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would 
remain private.” . . .  the Supreme Court's analyses in Place and Jacobsen indicate that a possessor 
of contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed. No 
legitimate expectation of privacy is impinged by governmental conduct that can "reveal nothing 
about noncontraband items.110
The dissent then moved to distinguish Kyllo on two key points.  First, in Kyllo, the police used a 
thermal imaging device that detected unusual amounts of heat that could have resulted from criminal, or 
non-criminal activity within the home.111 The thermal imaging device is "not limited to discovering the 
presence of absence of contraband drugs."112 However, a dog sniff detects only narcotics and does not 
expose the presence of “‘non contraband items, activities, or information that would otherwise be hidden 
from public view.’”113 
Second, the dissent distinguished Rabb from Kyllo by pointing to the fact that thermal imaging is 
an advanced technology that is not in public use, while a dog's nose does not carrying such status.114 It 
argued that the sense of smell is a familiar tool of perception "much older than the common law or the 
Bill of Rights” and that dog reactions are historically admissible as evidence at trial.115 Simply, the 
dissent saw the use of a dog sniff as not sharing the technologically superior sense capabilities as the man-
made thermal imager in Kyllo.
Lastly, the dissent addressed the majority’s analysis of Nelson.116 As stated by the dissent:  
"Seven words summarize the majority's reasoning:  A hotel room is not a house. "117 The dissent 
contended that “one has an expectation of privacy in a hotel room similar to that in a home.  Both a hotel 
 
105.  Id. at 1198.  
106.  755 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).   
107.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1198 (quoting Flowers, 755 So. 2d at 710 (quoting Daniels v. Cochran, 654 So. 2d 609, 
613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)(citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1984))). 
108.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1201.   
109.  878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
110.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1201 (citing Coyler, 878 F.2d at 475).  In Coyler, the court determined that a dog sniff of 
an Amtrak roomette was not a Fourth Amendment search because its narrow scope reveals only items that are contraband in 
nature—to which a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy over because of their illegitimate status.  See Coyler, 878 F.2d 
at 477 (holding that because a dog sniff does not detect noncontraband items, and because its scope is limited to such, it is not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment). 
111. See Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1201.  “In Kyllo, the police used a thermal imaging device to detect that unusual 
amounts of heat were being generated inside a home, ‘phenomenon that is not itself criminal and could well have been a non-
criminal explanation.’”  Id. (quoting Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald I ) v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d 864 
A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004)).  
112. Id. In its analysis the dissent distinguished the thermal imaging device from a dog sniff, stating: “The 
surveillance device was ‘a sophisticated piece of technology that revealed information, other than the presence of contraband, 
about the interior of Kyllo’s home.’”  Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 
113.  Id. (citing Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 
114.  See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1201–02. According to the dissent, “[t]he canine sense of smell is not the type of 
rapidly advancing technology that concerned the Supreme Court in Kyllo.”  Id. at 1202.   
115.  Id. (citing Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1037).  
116.  See Id. at 1202 ( “Finally, the majority opinion struggles at length to distinguish Nelson [citation omitted].”).  
117.  Id. at 1202–03.  
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hallway and front doorstep are open to the public.  [Therefore] a dog sniff in each case should be judged 
the same.”118 In summation, "[w]hat is good for the home should be good for the Hilton.”119
V.  CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS OF THE DECISION  
A. The Majority’s Deterrence from Place and Jacobsen  
 
The first flaw in the majority's reasoning in Rabb is their misapplication and interpretation of 
Jacobsen and Place. In Jacobsen and Place, the Supreme Court held that a dog sniff is not a Fourth 
Amendment search and that a dog sniff’s ability to detect only narcotics is so narrowly limited that it does 
not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy.120 
Central to the Supreme Court's holding in Place was the narrow focus of the dog sniff.121 A dog
sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics—making the information obtained by a dog sniff 
limited to illegitimate items.122 Simply, the Court stated that a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection 
dog was not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not violate a 
legitimate privacy interest.123 
Jacobsen then supplied the fuller rationale for why a narrowly focused investigate technique, like 
a dog sniff, is not a Fourth Amendment search.124 Justice Stevens pointed out that “the Fourth 
Amendment is not a plenary prohibition against all unreasonable police activity . . .  [it] is only a more 
limited protection against ‘[unreasonable] searches and seizures.’"125 Further, the Court stated that a 
search only occurs when an individual “expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable is infringed.”126 The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable is critically different from the mere expectation that certain facts will not come to the attention 
 
118.  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1203.  
119.  Id.  
120.  See Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald I ) v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1026 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).  “The Supreme 
Court’s holding [in Place] was clear that the canine sniff was not a ‘search’. . . central to its reasoning was the narrow focus of 
the dog sniff.”  Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1984) (holding that a dog sniff “did not constitute a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).  In Fitzgerald I, the court held that Jacobsen, although not a dog sniff case, 
“supplied the fuller rationale for why a narrowly focused investigative technique, one that reveals only the presence or absence of 
contraband, is not a Fourth Amendment ‘search.’”  Id. 
121.  Place, 462 U.S. at 707.  The Court held in Place that:  
 [T]he sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item . . .  
 In these respects, the [dog] sniff is sui generis.  We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so 
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and the content of the information revealed by 
the procedure.
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
122.  See Id. “ A ‘[dog] sniff’ by a well trained narcotics detection dog . . .does not expose noncontraband items 
that would remain hidden from public view.”  Id.  
123.  See Id. (holding that because a dog sniff is“less intrusive than a typical search” and because a dog sniff is 
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics ,” it does not “constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment”).  
124.  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1026 (holding that Jacobsen “ supplied the fuller rationale ” for why a dog sniff is 
not a Fourth Amendment search).  In Jacobsen, the Court’s rationale was that :  
. . . [M]erely disclosing that the substance is something other than [a narcotic]—such a result reveals nothing of 
special interest. Congress has decided  . . . to treat the interest in “privately” possessing [narcotics] as 
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal a substance is [a narcotic], and no other arguably 
“private” fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.  
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (emphasis supplied). 
125.  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1026 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).  In Jacobsen, Justice Stevens pointed out 
that:  “ The first Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that the ‘right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against [unreasonable] searches and seizures, shall not be violated’ . . . .”  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (emphasis 
supplied). 
126.  Id. at 1027  
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of authorities.  As such, governmental conduct that only reveals whether a substance is an illegal narcotic 
compromises no legitimate privacy interest.127 
Thus, the likelihood that conduct revealed by a dog sniff will disclose private information that 
would compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize a dog sniff as 
a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.128 Simply, based on the Place and Jacobsen decisions, it is 
reasonable to hold that a police investigatory tool, such as a dog sniff, is not a search if it merely reveals 
the presence or absence of contraband.129 
Moreover,  the rationale of the Supreme Court for treating a dog sniff as a non-search is that the 
binary nature of a dog sniff’s inquiry—"contraband yea or nay?, precludes the possibility of infringing on 
any expectation of privacy that society objectively considers to be legitimate”—even at the home.130 : "It 
is the criminal nature of the possession itself that takes the activity out from under the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment, not the place where the possession occurs."131 
B. The Location of the Dog Sniff 
The next point of criticism in Rabb is the majority's disregard of the fact that the dog sniff 
occurred in a public place where the drug dog,“Chevy,” had a constitutional right to occupy.132 In 
deciding whether a dog sniff is a Fourth Amendment search, the focus is on the location, or vantage point, 
from which the sniff is conducted.  For instance, if the dog sniff is conducted in a public area it has a 
constitutional right to occupy, the sniff does not violate the Fourth Amendment.133 
127.  See Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420, 436 (Md. 2001).  
Additionally, in Jacobsen [citation omitted] the Supreme Court considered whether a chemical test was a 
controlled dangerous substance was a search.  The Supreme Court expanded on its holding in Place and held 
that a police investigatory tool, such as a dog sniff or a chemical test, is not a search if it merely reveals the 
presence or absence of contraband because the privacy interest in possessing contraband is not one that society 
recognizes as reasonable.  “Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the 
record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the 
testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”  
Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124) (emphasis supplied).  
128.  See Gadson v. State, 650 A.2d 1354, 1355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).   In Gadson, the court held that: 
“Whether the Fourth amendment was even involved, so as to require satisfaction, at that particular stage of the total investigative 
episode depends upon whether a sniff or smell by a drug detection dog constitutes a “search” within the contemplation of the 
Fourth Amendment. It does not.”  Id.  
129  See United States v. Coyler 878 F.2d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  According to the court in Coyler, “ [t]he 
Supreme Court’s analyses in Place and Jacobsen indicate that a possessor of contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation 
that its presence will not be revealed.  No legitimate expectation of privacy is impinged by governmental conduct that can ‘reveal 
nothing about noncontraband items.”  Id. (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n. 24).  
130  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1030.  According to the court in Fitzgerald I, “[i]f the possession of narcotics in an 
automobile or a suitcase is illegitimate, so too is the possession of narcotics in a home.”  Id.  
131  Id. 
132.  See Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1028 (quoting Gadson, 650 A.2d at 1355–56).  In Gadson the court, in 
analyzing whether a dog sniff outside of a closed trunk violated the Fourth Amendment, stated that:  
The elementary physics of the olfactory sense, at least in circumstances such as these, is that the dog’s nose 
never intrudes into a constitutionally protected area, such as the appellant’s trunk.  It is rather the case that the 
dog’s nose remains outside, where the dog’s nose has a constitutionally unassailable right to be, and that the 
suspicious and incriminating vapors come wafting across the public air to meet the dog’s nose on the dog’s 
nose’s turf.  We see no doctrinal difference, be the investigator man or beast, between standing outside and 
smelling aromas emanating from a truck, on the one hand, and standing outside and hearing sounds resonating 
from a truck, on the other.  In each case, the sensory receptor remains outside where it has a right to be and the 
stimuli come to meet it there.  
Gadson, 659 A.2d at 1355–56 (emphasis supplied).  
133.   See United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 101 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 
1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that “[i]t is well settled that the olfactory activities of a trained police dog legitimately on 
the premises do not constitute a search).  In Burns, the court stated in its analysis of a Fourth Amendment search that:  
What a person knowingly exposes is not constitutionally protected from observation.  [citation omitted].  
Neither are activities or objects which are exposed, regardless of subjective intent, in a manner inconsistent with 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  [citation omitted].  Thus, it is not a “search” to observe that which occurs 
openly in public. [citation omitted].  Nor is it a search when a law enforcement officer makes visual 
14
The Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has affirmed this point in United States 
v. Roby,134 where it took a firm stance about the unassailability of the dog’s location and about the spot 
where the act of sensing occurs.135 The court held that although the defendant contended that 
 
[T]he dog’s detection of the odor molecules emanating from his room is the equivalent of a 
warrantless intrusion.  We find that it is not.  The fact that the dog, as odor detector, is more 
skilled than a human does not render the dog’s sniff illegal.  [citation omitted].  Just as evidence in 
the plain view of officers may be searched without a warrant, evidence in the plain smell may be 
detected without a warrant.136 
It is the fact that in Rabb the dog's nose was outside where it had a right to occupy, and that the 
contraband stimuli come out to meet, which holds the dog sniff in Rabb constitutionally permissible.137 
This was affirmed by United States v. Reed,138 which held squarely that the critical spot for the 
constitutional assessment is not the place whence the odors emanate, but the place where the act of 
smelling occurs.139 Just as the viewing by humans of contraband in plain sight does not amount to a 
Fourth Amendment search, the sniffing of contraband by a trained drug dog in a public area does not 
constitute a search.140 As held in Reed: "As long as the observing person or the sniffing canine are 
legally present at their vantage when their respective senses are aroused by obviously incriminating 
evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has not occurred.”141 
C. Coyler and Reed’s Defeat of Thomas.
The majority has supported its position with the decision in Thomas. However, the Thomas 
opinion has been met with universal disapproval from “all of the federal and district courts that have 
considered it.”142 As stated in United States v. Hogan,143 “Thomas appears never to have been followed 
by any court outside the Circuit and has been criticized by several other circuit courts."144 
observations from a vantage point he rightfully occupies.  [citation omitted].  This applies also to perceptions 
derive from hearing or smelling. 
Id. at 100; see also Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007 (holding that a dog sniff of “the air outside [a] defendant’s locker did not 
constitute a search . . . [and] it follows that the search of [the] defendant’s locker did not violate his Fourth Amendment 
rights”). 
134.  122 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1997). 
135  See Id. at 1125 (holding that a dog sniff conducted outside a hotel room in a common area does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment).  
136.  Id. at 1124–25 (emphasis supplied). 
137.  See State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that “[n]o Florida 
court has ever held that an officer’s smelling of marijuana at the front door of a residence is a Fourth Amendment 
search that requires a warrant”). 
138.  141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998).  
139.  Id. at 649.  In Reed, the court squarely held that: 
Just as the sniffing of contraband by trained [drug dogs] does not constitute an unlawful search, nether does the 
viewing by humans of contraband in plain sigh amount to an unlawful search. As long as the observing person 
or the sniffing [drug dog] are legally present at their vantage when their respective senses are aroused by 
obviously incriminating evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has not occurred.  
Id. 
140.  Id.
141.  Id.; see also State v. Funkhouser, 782 A.2d 387, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (holding that a drug dog’s “. 
. . smelling or sniffing of the exterior surface of an otherwise protected repository . . . is not a ‘search’ within the contemplation 
of the Fourth Amendment”).  
142  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1031. “[T]he very correctness of the Thomas decision is called into question by its 
assertion that the defendant ‘had a legitimate expectation that [contraband] in his closed apartment would remain private.’” 
United States v. Coyler, 878 F.2d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing United State v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985). 
“. . . [A] possessor of contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed.”  Id.  
143  122 F. Supp. 2d 358 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
144  Id. at 369.  
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For example, in Coyler, the District Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
questioned the Thomas court’s reasoning; specifically because of its statement that a defendant "‘had a 
legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would remain private.’"145 The court in 
Coyler affirmed the Supreme Court's analyses of both Place and Jacobsen—stating that a possessor of 
contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation of privacy as to that possession.146 The court held that 
a dog sniff of the exterior of a dwelling place, an Amtrak roomette, is not a Fourth Amendment search 
because of the limited and binary nature of the canine inquiry to detect only illegitimate contraband 
items.147 
Moreover, in Reed, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals joined the District of 
Columbia Circuit in criticizing the reasoning in Thomas—stating that the Thomas holding ignored the 
Supreme Court's determination in Place that a person has no legitimate privacy interest in the possession 
of contraband.148 Reed affirmed the point in Place that it is the ability of a dog sniff to detect only the 
presence or absence of narcotics that allocates it Fourth Amendment protection.149
D. Kyllo is Inapplicable 
The majority in Rabb stated that the decision Kyllo controlled—holding that a dog sniff is a 
sensory enhancing technology.150 However, a dog’s nose is not a sensory enhancing technology like the 
thermal imager discussed in Kyllo because, unlike a dog sniff that detects on the presence or absence of 
narcotics, the thing detected by a thermal imager is the unusual amounts of heat generated inside the 
home—“a phenomenon that is not itself criminal and could well have had a non–criminal explanation.”151
For example, the thermal imager may detect legitimate activity like “what hour each night the lady of the 
house takes her daily sauna."152 Thus, unlike a dog sniff, the surveillance device used in Kyllo is a 
sophisticated piece of technology that reveals legitimate information other than the presence or absence of 
narcotics.153 
145  Coyler, 878 F.2d at 475 (quoting Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367).  
146  Id.  In Coyler the court held that:  “Place and Jacobsen indicate that possessor of contraband can maintain no 
legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed.  No legitimate expectation of privacy is impinged by governmental 
conduct that can ‘reveal nothing about noncontraband items.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 n. 24 
(1984)).  
147  See Coyler, F.2d at 474 (holding that “because of the binary nature of the information disclosed by the [dog] 
sniff, no legitimately private information is revealed”).  
148  United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998).  “[The Thomas] holding ignores the Supreme 
Court’s determination in Place that ‘[n]o legitimate expectation of privacy is impinged by governmental conduct that can “reveal 
nothing about noncontraband items.”’”  Id. (citing Coyler, 878 F.2d at 475 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n.24).  
149  See Id. at 649.   
The Supreme Court has held that a “[dog] sniff” does not unreasonably intrude upon a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. [citation omitted].  This is so, because “the manner in which information is obtained 
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.  Moreover, the sniff discloses 
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.  
Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).  
150.  State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  “This logic is no different than that 
expressed in Kyllo . . . [t]he use of the dog, like the use of a thermal imager, allowed law enforcement to use sense-enhancing 
technology to intrude into the constitutionally-protected area of Rabb’s house.” Id.  
151.  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1036.  The dissent in Rabb distinguished Kyllo from Rabb by stating that:  
In Kyllo, the police used a thermal imaging device to detect that unusual amounts of heat were being generated 
inside a home, a “phenomenon that is no itself criminal and could well have been a non-criminal explanation. 
[citation omitted].  The surveillance device was “a sophisticated piece of technology that revealed information, 
other than the presence of contraband, about the interior of Kyllo’s home.  
Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1201 (Gross, J., dissenting) (citing Wilson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2002)).  
152.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).   
153.  See Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2003).  
[A] government investigative technique, such as a dog sniff, that discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, and 
does not expose noncontraband items, activity, or information that would otherwise remain hidden from public view, does 
not intrude on a legitimate expectation of privacy and is thus not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. [citation 
omitted]   
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Further, the Court’s concern in Kyllo was with the unfamiliarity of technology not in general 
public use as used by law enforcement when conducting a warrantless search of the home—holding that 
when the government uses such a device, the surveillance is a “search.”154 However, the investigative use 
of a dog sniff is not even considered “technology.”155 Rather, 
 
It is, a fortiori, not an unfamiliar or rapidly advancing technology that “is not in general use.”  
Bloodhounds have been chasing escaping prisoners and other fugitives through the swamp for 
hundreds of years, with posses following dutifully and trusting implicitly in the canine expertise, 
even at the closed doors of cabins and houses.  The canine reactions, moreover, have traditionally 
been admissible as evidence even at a trial on the merits, let alone in an ex parte application for a 
warrant. 
 The use of the sense of smell generally is a familiar tool of perception much older than the 
common law Bill of Rights.156 
Simply, the dog’s sense of smell is not an “arcane science known only to the police ,” but rather, 
part of the foundation of America’s general culture.157 The Supreme Court recognized the sense of smell 
as a permissible law enforcement device as early as Taylor v. United States,158 where the Court stated that 
"[p]rohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of possible crime."159 
Therefore, Kyllo should not have been the controlling case in Rabb because there is nothing in 
Kyllo that brings into question whether the dog sniff in Rabb violated the Fourth Amendment—especially 
because a dog sniff does not share the same technological prow less as a thermal imager.160 
E. Nelson Does Apply 
 
The majority in Rabb should have applied Nelson because “[w]hat is good for the home should be 
good for the Hilton.”161 Because a hotel and a home share an almost identical privacy interest, and 
because in both Nelson and Rabb the drug dog alerted in a public area, the Nelson decision was 
applicable. 162 Further, as stated in Nelson, the true "test of legitimacy is not whether the individual 
chooses to conceal assuredly 'private' activity.  Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's 
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."163 It is not 
 
By contrast, the use of a thermal imaging device to record the heat being emitted from with a home—the issue in 
Kyllo—is a “search” because it can reveal information, other than the presence of contraband, about the interior of a home. 
[citation omitted]    
The dog’s sniff in this case did not explore the details of the house; nor could the sniff reveal anything about 
the house other than the presence of an illegal narcotic [citation omitted] . . . the drug dog sniff . . . d[oes] not 
intrude on a legitimate expectation of privacy, it [i]s not a search and thus not an illegal one. 
Id. (citing Wilson, 98 S.W.3d at 272).  
154.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that by “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology . . . is not in general public use”). 
155.  Fitzgerald I, 837 A.2d at 1037 (“The investigative use of the animal sense, human or canine, cannot even be 
defined as a technology.”).  
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. (“The use of the dog’s sense of smell is not an arcane science known only to the police; it is something 
deeply ingrained in our general culture.”).  
158.  286 U.S. 1 (1932).  
159. Id. at 6.  
160. See State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“The [dog] sense of smell is not the 
type of rapidly advancing technology that concerned the Supreme Court in Kyllo.”).   
161  Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1203 (Gross, J., dissenting); see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) 
(holding that:  “What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security of man relies upon when he places himself or his property 
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or office, his hotel room or his automobile”).    
162.  See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1203.  “[O]ne has an expectation of privacy in a hotel room similar to that in a home.  
Both a hotel hallway and front doorstep are open to the public. The dog sniff in [both Nelson and Rabb] should be judged by the 
same standards.”  Id.  
163.  Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 182–83 (1984)).  
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the location of the dog sniff that decides whether the sniff violates the Fourth Amendment, but rather 
what the dog is detecting; and a well-trained narcotics dog will detect only the presence or absence of 
narcotics—an item whose possession is illegitimate anywhere, including a hotel and the home.164 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The majority in Rabb incorrectly held that the dog sniff conducted outside the home in Rabb was 
unconstitutional.  This is because the dog sniff did not offend a legitimate expectation of privacy, and 
because the dog sniff is not a sense enhancing technology like the thermal imager in Kyllo.
Furthermore, the use of drugs is still an ongoing problem not only in Florida, but in the United 
States; especially the use of Marijuana—the most widely used illicit drug in the United States.165 Further, 
the majority of marijuana acquisitions—57%—are made inside a home, apartment, or dormitory, with 
87% of marijuana user’s most recent acquisitions occurring indoors.166 These statistics indicate that drug 
use is still central in indoor places—such as the home.  
 The use of the dog sniff gives law enforcement a valuable tool in battling drug use because it has 
a minimal risk of violating an individual's privacy interest by revealing only substances that a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy over.167 Essentially, the dog sniff aids law enforcement and does not 
unnecessarily infringe on an individual, legitimate privacy interest.   
Moreover, when the risk of offending only a criminal’s illegitimate expectation of privacy is 
weighed against the benefits of pinpointing drug possession in a dwelling place, there is no Fourth 
Amendment violation—but rather a legitimate exercise of law enforcement. I contend that the Framers of 
the United States Constitution did not intend for the Fourth Amendment to protect the illegitimate 
expectation of privacy over criminal activity.  
The decision in Rabb runs the risk of handcuffing policemen in Florida as they try to battle the 
war on drugs; especially in dwelling places where, as shown by the statistics above, drug acquisitions are 
apparent.  Also, if other districts follow the Rabb holding it may lead to negative effects in the battle 
against drug use in the United States.  It is imperative that this case is overturned so that its reasoning is 
not followed by other courts in the future. 
 
164.  See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).  In Caballes, the Supreme Court held that it treats a  
“. . . [Dog] sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as “sui generis” because “it discloses only the 
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.  [citation omitted] 
Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that “does not expose noncontraband 
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view [citation omitted] . . . generally does not implicate 
legitimate privacy interests.” 
. . . [Further], [a] dog sniff conducted . . . reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no 
individual has any right to possess . . . .” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).  
165.  Jonathan P. Caulkins & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Marijuana Markets:  Inferences From Reports by the 
Household Population, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 173, 191–92 (2006). 
166.  Id. at 179, 191.  
167.  Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537 (holding that “[b]ecause a dog sniff ‘could reveal nothing about non-contraband 
items,’ it does not generally intrude into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy”) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 124 n.24 (1984)).  
